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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL DAVID DESTEFANO, 
Plaintiff & Respondent 
-vs-
OREGON MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY and MID-CENTURY 
EXCHANGE, 
Defendant & Appellant 
Case No. 860472 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 12, 1986, the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
with the Honorable Raymond S. Uno presiding, entered Summary 
Judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant Oregon 
Mutual Insurance Company in the form of a Declaratory Judgment 
under Rule 57, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, declaring that 
plaintiff is entitled to recover benefits under the uninsured 
motorists provisions of Oregon Mutual Insurance Company 
Automobile Protection Policy Number APD063645, issued to Rod L. 
Copper and Deanna Cooper of Bend, Oregon, providing insurance 
coverage for a 1978 Ford Pinto automobile described in said 
insurance policy. 
The court also ordered that defendant Mid-Century Insurance 
Exchange be granted Summary Judgment of Dismissal from this 
action. No appeal from this latter Order has been filed. 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case are virtually undisputed. Defendant 
Oregon Mutual Insurance Company issued an automobile policy to 
Mr. and Mrs. Rod L. Cooper, residents of the state of Oregon. 
(R.39-43) One of the vehicles covered by the insurance policy 
was a 1978 Ford Pinto automobile.(R.44-60) With the consent of 
one of the named insureds, the vehicle was driven to Utah by Mr. 
David Hancock, who worked with the plaintiff at a local car 
dealership.(Dep.11,15) Mr. Hancock was interested in selling the 
car, and the plaintiff thought he had a buyer for it.(Dep.16) On 
November 17, 1984, Mr. Hancock allowed the plaintiff to drive the 
automobile to Kaysville, Utah to show the car to his prospective 
buyer and her parents. After driving the automobile around, the 
parents decided they wanted to buy the car.(Dep. 16) With the 
plaintiff riding as a passenger, the prospective buyer then drove 
the vehicle back to Salt Lake County along the 1-15 freeway until 
she ran out of gas at the 90th South on-ramp.(Dep.21) After she 
parked the car far off the traveled portion of the roadway, the 
plaintiff walked to the nearest service station and telephoned 
Mr. Hancock for assistance in refilling the Pinto's locked gas 
tank.(Dep.25,26) Mr. Hancock then drove to the service station 
in his Mazda automobile, bought some gas, and then transported 
the plaintiff and the gas back to the stalled Pinto.(Dep.27) He 
parked the Mazda behind the Pinto, and then the plaintiff got out 
of the Mazda and began pouring gasoline into the gas tank of the 
Pinto.(Dep.30,31) While he was pouring the gasoline into the 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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automobile, an uninsured Volkswagon Rabbit automobile ran into 
the left rear of the Mazda vehicle at high speed and pushed it 
forward into the rear end of the Pinto and into the plaintiff's 
body, causing serious injury to the plaintiff.(Dep.32-35) The 
driver of the Volkswagon was Tammy Dowdell, and she had no 
insurance.(Dep.37,44,45) 
Because the driver of the Volkswagon Rabbit was uninsured, 
this action was brought to determine if plaintiff is entitled to 
benefits under the uninsured motorist provisions of the Ford 
Pinto automobile that he was servicing with gasoline when the 
accident took place* 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I: Since this action does not concern insurance 
coverage for no-fault benefits, bodily injury liability, property 
damage liability, and medical benefits coverage, there is no need 
for the Supreme Court to decide whether the Young Driver 
Limitation Endorsement of the insurance policy in question bars 
recover for such benefits under Oregon Law. These matters are 
not relevant to the issues decided by the trial court in the 
above action. 
POINT NO. II: Oregon law requires that automobile liability 
insurance policies shall cover losses arising from injury to 
persons "occupying" the insured vehicle and "occupying" is 
further defined as being "in or upon or entering or alighting 
from" a vehicle. The Oregon Supreme Court has held that a person 
remains an "occupant" of a vehicle until the person has completed 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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all acts reasonably expected to be performed under the 
circumstances or reasonably incidental to the disembarking 
process and commences a new course of conduct. The Oregon 
Supreme Court has adopted holdings from other jurisdictions to 
support this ruling. Cases from other jurisdictions have held 
that a person is "occupying" a vehicle while either preparing to 
perform or while performing an activity related to the 
maintenance, use or operation of an insured vehicle*. Where 
plaintiff was pouring gasoline into a disabled vehicle, he was in 
such close proximity to the automobile and so relate*d to its 
operation and use that those activities were an integral part of 
its operation that one could say he was "occupying" the vechicle. 
POINT NO. Ill; Defendant Oregon Mutual Insurance Company 
raised no issue on the trial court level as to the propriety and 
timliness of the court's entry of Summary Judgment. The facts 
are virtually undisputed by all the parties to this action, and 
such parties have always assumed that one of them is entitled to 
Summary Judgment because of the lack of any material issues of 
fact remaining to be resolved by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THIS COURT DOES NOT NEED TO DETERMINE IF 
THE YOUNG DRIVER LIMITATION ENDORSEMENT 
PRECLUDES INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR NO-FAULT 
BENEFITS, BODILY INJURY LIABILITY, PROPERTY 
DAMAGE LIABILITY, AND MEDICAL PAYMENTS . 
BENEFITS. 
Defendant Oregon Mutual Insurance Company asserts on this 
appeal that the trial court erred in failing to determine if the 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Oregc: * ;^1 Insurance Companv concedes J_haJ" the Oregon 
.^
 ; .^m^ r^ >.^ - Hartford Occident & Indemnity Company v, 
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m a t l\. Vi'ung I-r-'w*:* L i m r a t . m Hndors -men" exc ludes ta i n s u r e d 
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 } *i i iaui L J t .\ . or )Ut-r * y 
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disabilitv claims under the Personal !:•*•. y 
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Protection Provisions of this policy. The 
parties make the same argument in relation to 
these payments as they do to those made under 
the Uninsured Motorist Provisions. Although 
the age of the driver is relevant to the 
coverage under the Personal Injury Protection 
Provision, it is unnecessary to decide 
whether such coverage was excluded by the 
driver restriction endorsement* (Emphasis 
added) 
It is likewise unnecessary for the court in Utah to decide 
that broad question in this litigation. The claim made by the 
plaintiff in this action is for uninsured motorist benefits, none 
of which are limited by the Young Driver Limitation Endorsement. 
Apparently, defendant Oregon Mutual Insurance Company wants some 
kind of an advisory opinion on this subject, but there is no need 
for the court to indulge in such speculation in the instant case. 
POINT NO. II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO RECOVER 
UNINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS UNDER THE 
OREGON MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY POLICY. 
Defendant Oregon Mutual Insurance Company argues on this 
appeal that the trial court erroneously held that plaintiff was 
entitled to recover uninsured motorist benefits in this action. 
As a basis for this claim, defendant claims that plaintiff was 
not "occupying" the insured vehicle when the accident took place. 
Defendant has correctly pointed out that Oregon law provides 
that automobile liability insurance shall cover losses arising 
from injury to persons "occupying" the insured vehicle. That 
status is statutorily defined as a person who is "in or upon or 
entering or alighting from" an insured vehicle. Defendant argues 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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We 3umiliar «- ' n* stipulated racis Berg was 
driving a \ehicle southbound r- Interstate 
Highway 5 when her vehicle collided head-on 
with a vehicle being operated northbound in 
•.••the southbound lanes of th*> freeway. Bei g 
•. was thrown from her \ehicle by the impact and ' • 
landed somewhere in t.he southbound lanes. A 
truck driver who witnessed the oo] lision sa i i 
Berg try to a f t her head and right arm In i t 
otherwise remain stationary. He then saw the 
Miller vehicle approach t.ht Accident scene, 
swerve, skid sideways, strike Berg and drag 
her a distance before stopping with her under 
a portion ri1 i1 truck driver told 
..Miller, "G^t ort ot her, ' and Mi ller drove 
her car forward and over Berg. Miller felt a 
"thump" wh• ~j *^: - i* was skidding, and a 
second "thumj- wn;i^ driving forward ^ n 
compliance wi * ^ * v* truck drivers .iireotivp 
1
 .* t- m argued ln^:_ iJerg wa<? no+- en: \ j --vi -w i ;jein-fi"*"s 
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Court to define the word "occupying" to determine if Berg was a 
pedestrian. 
In ruling against the insurance company and in finding that 
Berg was not "occupying" the vehicle she was ejected from, the 
court made the following explanation: 
Following her involuntary ejection from 
her vehicle, Berg landed in a traffic lane 
where, except for attempting to lift her head 
and right arm, she remained stationary. From 
the time she landed on the highway until the 
time she was struck by Miller's vehicle, she 
was apparently not ambulatory. In our 
opinion, those facts permit no other 
conclusion but that Berg at that point had 
completed all acts that a person in her 
circumstances reasonably would be expected to 
have done. She had gone as far as she was 
going to go in leaving her vehicle; in fact, 
as far as she could go. She was not 
"alighting" from the vehicle; she had 
"alighted". 
That she then did not seek a place of 
safety or embark on a different course of 
conduct is not dispositive; she was unable to 
do so. We find that Berg completed the 
"alighting " process upon coming to rest on 
the pavement. From then on she no longer was 
"occupying" her vehicle and her status 
necessarily was that of a pedestrian within 
the policy and statutory definitions. The 
trial court erred in concluding that she was, 
as a matter of law, "occupying" her vehicle. 
Based upon the above language, defendant Oregon Mutual 
Insurance Company now asks this court to determine that the 
plaintiff was not occupying the insured vehicle when he was 
pouring gas into the fuel tank. The facts of the Berg case are 
completely different than the matter now before the court, and 
the language of the Berg case would actually compel a contrary 
result. After noting that no Oregon cases (prior to Berg) have 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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c o n s i d e i e cii t h e ci e f :i n :i t :i o n o i ! f o c c i i p y :i n gf"" o i "' p e d e s t r :i a n,l! ' "( J :i t h i n. 
t h e c o n t e x t o f i 1:1 s u r a n c e p o 1 i c i e s a n d 0 r e g o n 1 a w, t h e C o u r t o f 
A p p e a 1 s o f 0 r ego n r e v i ewe d t h e 1 e a d i n g cases i n t h e f :i e 1 d t h a t 
: c 1:1 s i d e r t h o 3 e :: :> 1:1 2 e • ]::: t 3 ' I h • s > 1 a 1 1 g 1 1 a g e : • f t h 2 : • :> 1 1,1: I:, a J t h c 1 i g h 
s o m e wh a t 1 e n g t h y, :i s qu o t e d herein s o t h e c o u r t w 1 11 c 1 e a r J: y s e e 
the error of the argument made by the defendant in its Memorandum 
: f \ 1 ithori t:i e s . •; • . ,• • /.. •.
 ; • '. . . . . . 
No Oregon cases have considered the definition .-f 
"occupying" or "pedestrian" within the context or 
insurance policies and ORS 743.800. The parties, 
however, have cited us to a number of decisions from 
other jurisdicti ons construing si mi 1 ar or ident
 ;- -
provisions. S e e , e.g. U n i t e d S t a t e s Fide 1 i t y .k. 
Guaranty v. Daly, 384 S o . 2 d T 3 50 ~~ (F1a.App.198 0 ) : 
Industrial Fire and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Collier, 334 
So.2d 148 (Fla.App.1976); Stoddard v. "AID" Insurance 
Co. (Mutual)t 97 Idaho 508, 547 PIId 1113 (1976 
Nelson v. Iowas Mutual Insurance Company, 16 3 Mon* 
515 P.2d 362 (1973); Kantola v. State Farm In,. 
Ohio Misc. 11 , 405 N.E.2d 744 (1979). 
We find • JS>«- u«- . - , 
'"alighting from' most notewurilj,. . -n S to.i^ a . -1 v , _^ 
Insurance Co. (Mutual) , supr \t insured, a 
paraplegic, had parked his car in a garage and begun to 
get out of it by hoisting himself into a wheelchair 
•-hen he noted leaking gasoline; he traveled toward the 
rear of the .car by grasping it and pulling himself 
along, inspected, the gas tank cover, and then noticed 
flames. He was burned, while leaving the garage. In 
determining whether the insured \ ras covered under a 
policy provision that defined " occupying" as "in or 
upon or entering into or alighting from,"' ,. the court 
held. that he was "occupying"' the car in terms of 
"alighting from" it because he had not completed all 
acts that could reasonably be expected from those in 
similar situation, not all acts whi ch would normally be 
performed in 1 eaving the car, and he had not embarked 
upon an entirely distinct course of conduct. (He had 
not taken hi s packages with him and had not closed the 
car door.) 9' i Idaho at 51.1 547 P. Id 1113. Kantola v. 
State Farm Insurance» supra, was an action to recover 
for injuries sustained by a child who was struck by a 
motor vehicle whi 1 e crossing the road after ge11ing off 
a school bus. I he issue before the court was whether • 9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the child was "occupying" the bus when injured; the 
policies of insurance defined "occupying" to include 
"alighting from". The court held that "alighting from" 
a school bus included reaching a place of safety, 
because that is a course of conduct reasonably 
incidental to leaving and alighting from a school bus, 
which was statutorily required to remain stopped as a 
protective measure until the child reached such place. 
62 Ohio Misc. at 13, 405 N.E.ld 744. 
The import of these cases appears to be that a 
person remains an "occupant" of a vehicle until the 
person has completed all acts reasonably expected to be 
performed under the circumstances or reasonably 
incidental to the disembarking process and commences a 
new course of conduct. 
Terms used in insurance policies such as "upon", "entering 
into", "alighting from", "getting out" or "getting off" are 
exemplified by decisions that upheld coverage for a claimant who 
was injured while he stood beside a taxi to pay the driver, 
Allstate Ins. CO. v. Flaumenbaum, 62 Misc.2d 32, 305 N.Y.Supp.2d 
447 (1970), and for a claimant who was struck by an uninsured 
motorist while unlocking the door of an insured vehicle, Box v. 
Doe, 221 So.2d 666 (Louisiana 1969). When the judicial opinions 
that resolve coverage disputes in these and similar situations 
are considered as a group, they seem to define the coverage 
provisions "upon", "entering into", or "alighting from" in terms 
of a reasonable perimeter around an insured vehicle. So long as 
drivers or passengers are within an area that is reasonably close 
to an insured vehicle, they are covered by the uninsured motorist 
insurance. Estate of Cepeda v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co., 37 App.Div.2d 454, 326 N.Y. Supp. 864 (1971); Schindler v. 
Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 41 Misc.2d 590, 245 
N.Y. Supp. 90 (1963) . 
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Additionally, there are many appellate opinions interpreting 
the term "occupying" in situations in which claimants were 
injured while either preparing to perform or performing an 
activity related to the maintenance, use or operation of an 
insured vehicle. A Louisiana decision approved recovery by a 
deputy sheriff who was standing between the Sheriff's vehicle and 
a stalled car in order to attach a pair of jumper cables when an 
uninsured motorist ran into the back of the stalled automobile 
and pinned the deputy between the two parked cars. Smith v. 
Girley, 260 La. 223, 255 So.2d 748 (1971). Similarly, a 
Wisconsin decision upheld coverage when an uninsured motorist 
struck a car pinning a claimant between two vehicles where 
claimant was holding a spare tire that was intended to separate 
and protect the bumpers of the cars when the second car was used 
to push the first car. Moherek v. Tucker, 69 Wise. 41, 230 
N.W.2d 148 (1975). A clear statement of judicial attitude is 
represented by the California decision of Cocking v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 6 Cal.App.3d 965, 86 Cal.Rptr. 193 
(1970). In Cocking, the claimant was injured while standing 
several feet from the insured vehicle preparing to put on snow 
chains. The court viewed the preparations for affixing the snow 
chains as placing the claimant "in the requisite physical 
relationship to the car" to bring him within the protection 
afforded to persons who are "upon" an insured vehicle. Id. at 
197. 
In the present case, defendants in support of their argument 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that plaintiff was not occupying the vehicle state that 
plaintiff's efforts to fill the fuel tank was evidence that he 
had embarked in a completely different course of conduct than 
occupying the vehicle as a passenger or driver. Defendants 
further contend that plaintiff had not occupied the insured 
vehicle for the considerable period of time it took to telephone 
Mr. Hancock, wait for Mr. Hancock's arrival, attempt to fill the 
gas tank, and otherwise complete all acts that a person in his 
circumstances reasonably would be expected to do. The court in 
Rice v. Allstate Ins. Co., 38 App.Div.2d 491, 330 N.Y.Supp.2d 660 
(1972) upheld coverage for a claimant who was driving one of two 
vehicles being taken to the same destination. Injury occurred 
when the claimant was struck by an uninsured motorist as she 
walked from the lead vehicle to the second vehicle to give the 
registration papers to the other driver. A claim was allowed 
against the insurer of the second vehicle, even though the 
claimant had never occupied or driven that vehicle in the course 
of the trip prior to the accident. The court reasoned "that the 
claimant had sufficiently made out her connection with . . . the 
car to establish her status as a passenger in that car . . . " Id 
at 494. 
In Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance Company v. Collier, 
334 So.2d 148 (FLa.App.1976), the Florida Court considered a case 
very similar to the one now before this court. In that action, 
the appellee was driving his Volkswagon home from work when one 
of the tires became flat. During the time he was changing the 
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tire, his car was struck by another automobile which caused the 
Volkswagon to strike and injure him. At the time he was injured, 
he was standing outside the Volkswagon with it jacked up, 
removing the spare tire from it. Appellee sought benefits under 
the PIP provisions of the insurance policy on the car that struck 
the Volkswagon. The Florida court denied benefits on grounds 
that he was "occupying" his own Volkswagon while he was changing 
the tire on that vehicle. 
The Supreme Court of Montana in the case of Nelson v. Iowa 
Mutual Insurance Company, 163 Mont. 82, 515 P.2d 362 (1973), held 
that a lady was still "occupying" her automobile (for purposes of 
PIP benefits) when she froze to death after getting out of her 
disabled automobile and proceeded south behind the car along a 
fence which was constructed of both barb wire and sheep fence. 
She followed the fence a distance of 269 feet and fell into a 
ditch at which time she fractured or dislocated her ankle. She 
then began crawling back to her car and was found dead about 143 
feet behind the automobile. Death was caused by frostbite and as 
a consequence of the injury to her ankle, blood loss, shock and 
cold temperature. The Montana court said that the deceased's 
activities after the accident were solely directed to extricating 
herself from the car to a place of safety. Such activity was 
reasonably carried out and was reasonably connected with the 
operation of the vehicle. 
The cases of Robson v. Lightning Rod Mutual Insurance 
Company, 393 NE 2d 1053 (Ohio 1978) and Manning v. Summit Home 
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Insurance Company, 623 P.2d 1235 (Ariz. 1980), are directly in 
point. In the Robson case, Robson was a passenger in Zaleski's 
automobile. They had visited a friend in a hospital and gone to 
a basketball game. They stopped at Robson's house to pick up a 
stereo which they intended to take to a friend's house for the 
evening. While Robson was placing the stereo in the open truck 
of Zaleski's car and moving other items into the trunk, Robson 
was struck by an uninsured motorist. Robson claimed uninsured 
motorist benefits under Zaleski's policy with Lightning Rod, and 
it refused coverage. The court held that the plaintiff was in 
sufficiently close contact with the insured's automobile so as to 
come within the protection of the defendant's insurance policy 
and that plaintiff was either upon or entering into the insured's 
vehicle at the time of the accident. 
In the Manning case, Summit issued its automobile liability 
policy to Joey Santa Maria containing uninsured motorist 
coverage. The coverage was for persons "occupying" the insured 
vehicle, and the policy defined "occupying" as in or upon or 
entering into or alighting from. While on a vacation trip in the 
Colorado mountains with Manning as passenger, Santa Maria 
encountered icy road conditions and stopped his car to put on 
tire chains. While Santa Maria was straightening out a chain 
preparatory to putting it on a rear tire, Manning got a camera 
out of the car, moved some distance away and took a picture of 
him. At Santa Maria's request for help, she replaced the camera 
in the car and moved to the side of the car to offer help. 
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Manning was standing two or three feet from the car when she was 
struck and injured by another vehicle driven by an uninsured 
motorist• Summit denied coverage. The appellate court held: 
"In our opinion the better reasoned cases 
indicate that if one's activities are in such 
close proximity to the car and so related to 
its operation and use that they are an 
integral part of one's occupancy and use of 
the car, then one may be said to be fupon' 
the car, and that the operative facts here 
clearly indicate that not only had the 
appellant actually been actively 
participating in the overall tire chaining 
project, but also that her location at the 
time of the accident was controlled by the 
necessity of her continued participation." 
The evidence in this case shows that the plaintiff's 
activities in putting gas in the Pinto automobile were in such 
close proximity to the Pinto automobile and so related to its 
operation and use that those activities were an integral part of 
one's occupancy and use of the Pinto automobile and that the 
plaintiff may be said to be upon that automobile. 
Existing case law offers overwhelming support for the 
position that plaintiff was "occupying" the insured vehicle for 
purposes of being deemed an insured person under the Oregon 
Mutual policy by virtue of both his proximity to the insured 
vehicle at the time of the accident and his activity in pouring 
gas into the vehicle, such activity being related to the use or 
maintenance of the vehicle. The trial court correctly held that 
plaintiff was "occupying" the Pinto automobile when the accident 
took place. 
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POINT NO. 3 
THE ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS 
ACTION WAS BOTH TIMELY AND PROPER. 
The last two points raised by defendant Oregon Mutual 
Insurance Company on this appeal concern the propriety and 
timeliness of the trial court's entry of Summary Judgment. These 
issues come as a surprise to the respondent. The record on 
appeal shows that defendant raised no such issues at the trial 
court level. On the contrary, defendant indicated in its 
Memoranda filed with the trial court and in its Brief on Appeal 
that the facts were virtually undisputed by all the parties to 
this action. Plaintiff and defendant Mid-Century Insurance 
Exchange consistently agreed with Oregon Mutual that no factual 
dispute remained to be determined by the trail court. In other 
words, all of the parties agreed that no genuine issue as to any 
material fact remained to be determined by the trial court and 
that one of the parties was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. 
Regarding the timeliness of the Summary Judgment, it should 
be noted that defendant Oregon Mutual Insurance Company filed its 
first Motion for Summary Judgment on February 5, 1986. That 
Motion was denied without prejudice to enable the plaintiff and 
the other defendant to conduct discovery proceedings. Oregon 
Mutual argued that no further discovery was needed at that time 
and that the issues could be resolved as a matter of law. 
Nevertheless, the court allowed the parties to take some 
depositions at that time. 
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A few months later, on July 10, 1986, defendant Oregon 
Mutual filed its second Motion for Summary Judgment. Its 
Memorandum in support of that Motion carefully outlined the 
undisputed facts and again implied that the issues could be 
resolved by the court as a matter of law. In its reply 
Memorandum filed in opposition to plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Oregon Mutual failed to raise any questions of fact and 
failed to assert that entry of Summary Judgment would be 
premature or contrary to Rule 56. 
The matters set forth in Arguments III and IV of Appellant's 
Brief are raised for the first time on this appeal. This court 
has ruled on a number of occasions that a party may not raise 
matters on appeal that were not first heard and considered by the 
trial court. See L.A. Drywall Inc. v. Whitmore Construction 
Company, Inc, 608 P.2d 626. Oregon Mutual should not be 
permitted to raise new issues on this appeal, and the court 
should reject its assertions that the trial court's entry of 
Summary Judgment was improper and untimely. 
CONCLUSION 
For reasons set forth herein, the court should affirm the 
Summary Judgment of the trial court and award costs to the 
plaintiff in connection with this appeal. 
4 rid 
DATED this (^ ~^~day of March, 1987. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
^MM^^-
yH. RA'LPH KLE&M 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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